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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44432
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2012-16304
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In what has become a pointless cycle, Johnny Lee Gibbs is still serving time
related to an offense for which he was sentenced in 1995 and served a twelve year
sentence.  In July of 2016, he came before the district court for probation violations,
including failure to pay costs for supervision.  Mr. Gibbs, who had at long last found a
job that would allow him to pay costs and fines, asked the district court to impose an
alternative sentence with local incarceration and work release, so that he could take
advantage of the job opportunity.  Despite its clear recognition that Mr. Gibbs had never
been successful with probation or parole, the district court revoked his probation and
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executed his underlying sentence but reduced the fixed portion of that sentence by one
year.
Mr. Gibbs does not deny his responsibility.  However, given the cyclical,
repetitive nature of this case, which clearly shows that further punishment and
supervision has proven to be fruitless and unnecessary, he asserts that the district court
abused its discretion when it executed his underlying sentence. The history of this case
makes it obvious that this decision will almost certainly only perpetuate a vicious circle.
Therefore, Mr. Gibbs asserts that the district court did not reach its decision through an
exercise of reason, and his sentence was not necessary to accomplish any of the goals
of sentencing.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 1995, Mr. Gibbs was convicted of rape because, when he was 24 years old,
he had sex with a 16 year-old girl.  (Presentence Report (“PSI”), pp.10, 25, 30, 53.)1
Although the record here is limited to Mr. Gibbs’s subsequent offense for failure to
register as a sex offender and therefore not absolutely clear on the nature of the “index
crime” in this case, it certainly appears that this was not a violent crime but rather a
sexual encounter in which the victim was a willing participant even though she could not
legally consent.  (See PSI, pp.25, 30, 53.)  In the PSI produced in 2009, Mr. Gibbs said
that he had a drinking problem in 1995 that led to his rape conviction “wherein he was
drinking and had sex with a 16 year-old girl.”  (PSI, p.30.)  As a result, Mr. Gibbs must
still register as a sex offender and take polygraph tests.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.143, Ls.8-20.)
1 All citations to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 56-page electronic document.
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For that offense, the district court imposed a twelve year sentence, with two
years fixed.  (PSI, p.10.)  In 2002, Mr. Gibbs was released on parole, but he violated his
parole in 2003 and subsequently served the remainder of his sentence in prison.  (PSI,
p.12.)  In 2007, he was released.  (PSI, p.12.)  However, in 2008, he was convicted of
failing to register as a sex offender and was placed on probation for four years.  (PSI,
pp.11-12.)  In 2010, the district court revoked Mr. Gibbs’s probation but retained
jurisdiction.  (PSI, pp.12-13.)  After completing a CAPP rider, Mr. Gibbs was released on
probation in 2011.  (PSI, p.13.)
In 2012, however, Mr. Gibbs pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender
again.  (PSI, p.12.)  The district court imposed a sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Gibbs on probation for four years.
(R., pp.123-24.)  Mr. Gibbs later admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the
district court continued his probation.  (R., pp.167-69.)  Subsequently, Mr. Gibbs
admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the district court executed the
underlying sentence but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.196-201.)  After successfully
completing another rider program, the district court placed Mr. Gibbs on probation for
three years.  (R., pp.209-10.)
Mr. Gibbs later admitted to violating the terms of his probation by putting himself
in jeopardy of being charged with a new crime by failing to pay for his sex offender
registration, using methamphetamine, entering a business where alcohol was sold, not
completing a polygraph test, not paying the costs of supervision, not maintaining full-
time employment, and not following through with treatment.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.137, L.11 –
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p.140, L.17.)  The parties agreed to proceed to disposition that same day.  (7/25/16
Tr., p.140, Ls.18-24.)
During that phase of the hearing, Mr. Gibbs’s counsel explained that the reason
Mr. Gibbs had violated some of the probation terms was his inability to obtain
employment as a sex offender.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.142, L.24 – p.143, L.7.)  He
acknowledged that Mr. Gibbs had some issues with drug use but said that failing to
register, and not paying the costs of supervision, was due to Mr. Gibbs’s struggles to
find a job.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.143, L.25 – p.144, L.4.)  He also pointed out that Mr. Gibbs
was “still being punished for a crime he committed some twenty-three years ago”
because the polygraph requirement was attributable to that conviction.  (7/25/16
Tr., p.143, Ls.8-12.)  He noted that Mr. Gibbs had recently been offered employment
and therefore recommended a period of local incarceration and a discharge from
probation, so that he could get out of the system and move on with his life.  (7/25/16
Tr., p.145, L.3 – p.146, L.14.)
Mr. Gibbs then spoke.  He also said that it had been over twenty years since his
“index crime” and that he had spent seventeen of those years incarcerated.  (7/25/16
Tr., p.147, Ls.10-20.)  He said that he lost his mother and sister during that time, and his
father now had cancer.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.147, Ls.18-24.)  Mr. Gibbs then asked the court
to consider two options.  First, he asked that the court commute his sentence to “to a
one-year local incarceration” with credit for time served and work release, so that he
could pay off the costs of his supervision and fines and “reintegrate back into society.”
(7/25/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.1-17.)  For “option number two,” he asked that the district court
impose the underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but reduce the
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indeterminate time by one year.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.18-24.)  He made it very clear,
however, that he did not want to go back to prison and said, “I would strongly ask you to
please consider option number one.  I just want this behind me.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.150,
Ls.3-5.)  Nevertheless, the district court revoked his probation and executed his
underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but reduced the indeterminate
portion of his sentence by one year.  (R., pp.247-49.)
Mr. Gibbs filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the district court’s order
executing his sentence.  (R., pp.255-57.)  He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion requesting leniency.  (R., pp.253-54.)  At the hearing on the Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Gibbs asked the district court to modify his sentence to three years fixed with no
indeterminate time.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.156, L.19 – p.157, L.19.)  However, the district court
denied the motion.  (R., p.272.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Gibbs’s probation and
executed his underlying sentence but reduced the indeterminate portion of his sentence
by one year?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Gibbs’s Probation And
Executed His Underlying Sentence But Reduced The Indeterminate Portion Of His
Sentence By One Year
Despite acknowledging that Mr. Gibbs had never been successful with probation
or parole, and despite the fact that Mr. Gibbs had a job opportunity pending that would
allow him to address some of the reasons he violated probation, the district court opted
to execute the underlying sentence instead of giving Mr. Gibbs a chance at work
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release.  The long history of this case makes it clear that this will put Mr. Gibbs in the
exact same position, which has never worked, and indeed has proven to be a waste of
the state’s resources.  As such, the district court did not reach this decision through an
exercise of reason and therefore abused its discretion.
Review of a sentence executed following the revocation of probation is based
“upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.” State v. Hanington,
148 Idaho 26, 29 (Ct. App. 2009).  Appellate sentencing examinations are based on an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000).  In
such a review, an appellate court considers “whether the court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its
specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of
reason.” State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1988)).  When a sentence is
unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).  Unless it appears that confinement was necessary “to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case,” a
sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).
Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, “under any reasonable view of the facts,”
because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and therefore an
abuse of discretion. Id.
In reflecting on his years of incarceration, Mr. Gibbs said, “There wasn’t a day
when I didn’t regret what I had done.  There wasn’t a day that I didn’t fight.  I have been
7
stabbed.  I have been beaten, and I have had worse happen to me.  Do I know what it’s
like to be a victim?  Yes.  To be powerless?  And because of that I will never ever create
another victim again.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.147, L.25 – p.148, L.8.)  He asked where the
State was when he was being victimized in prison,2 and if he had not finally paid his
debt to society.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.148, Ls.9-20.)  He said, “Your Honor, I stand before you
a humble man asking for you (sic) your empathy to feel my pain.  Please grant me the
relief I am requesting.  Give me my life back.  I just can’t do this no more, Your Honor, I
can’t.  I just ain’t got it in me.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.148, Ls.21-25.)
These statements, and the history of this case, prove that sentencing Mr. Gibbs
to another two years in prison followed by another potential term of parole was not
necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing and indeed was contrary to these goals in
some ways.  The PSI indicated that Mr. Gibbs’s most recent failure to register conviction
was his fifth felony conviction.  (PSI, p.13.)  But two of these convictions occurred
before his conviction for rape in 1995.  (PSI, p.10.)  Since then, the extent of his criminal
activity has consisted of two failure to register offenses, and five misdemeanors ranging
from resisting or obstructing officers to failing to purchase a driver’s license.  (PSI,
pp.11-12.)  In light of the fact that his index crime was apparently not a violent crime, he
has not committed any similar offenses, and none of his subsequent offenses indicate
he is dangerous, there is no indication that Mr. Gibbs poses any threat to society.
There is also no indication from the record that Mr. Gibbs ever attempted to abscond
2 Mr. Gibbs said he was sexually abused while prison guards watched when he was in a
contracted bed in a New Mexico prison.  (PSI, p.14.)
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when he was made aware that arrest warrants were issued for failing to register and for
probation violations.
With respect to the other sentencing goals, it is abundantly clear that the State
has exacted more than enough retribution for his index crime and for his failures to
register.  As for deterrence, it is evident that he has been deterred from committing any
other sex offense because he has committed none.  This was of course the reason for
his sentence in 1995.  That goal was accomplished long ago.  But it is also clear that
additional prison sentences and supervised periods of probation or parole are not
effective at deterring Mr. Gibbs from failing to register or abiding by the terms of his
probation.  That is because the combination of his probation status and his status as a
sex offender has set him up for failure.
At disposition, Mr. Gibbs’s counsel noted that Mr. Gibbs’s failure to pay his costs
of supervision and registration was largely due to his challenges to find a job given his
status as a sex offender.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.143, Ls.1-7.)  He also pointed out that
Mr. Gibbs is still being punished for a crime he committed over twenty years ago and for
which he served his entire sentence.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.143, Ls.8-20.)  He addressed the
cyclical, futile nature of the continuing punishment that only results in keeping Mr. Gibbs
“in the system” instead of letting him “move on with his life.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.145, Ls.7-
19.)  He asked, “Well, why do we keep putting John through the gristmill and grinding
him for something that he has already completed the sentence on and that is so long
ago in the past.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.143, Ls.21-24.)  He also asked, “So when does that
punishment for that crime ever stop?”  And he pointed out that part of the reason he
failed to register was because of his financial situation.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.144, Ls.16-20.)
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But he requested a viable alternative that may have finally worked for Mr. Gibbs.  He
said that Mr. Gibbs had a “job opportunity back with Harper’s Bread” and asked the
district court to give him work release and “[l]et him serve out the rest of his time locally
and discharge him from probation.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.146, Ls.1-5.)  He said, “if John was
going to reoffend as a sex offender, it would have occurred much sooner than this, but it
hasn’t,” and thus Mr. Gibbs had shown that it was not an issue in his life anymore.
(7/25/16 Tr., p.146, Ls.8-13.)
The continuing punishments have not had a positive effect on Mr. Gibbs’s
rehabilitation either because he is caught in a vicious circle.  There is no question that
Mr. Gibbs is responsible for his situation in many ways.  But at some point, that fact is
not as important as trying other options that may prove to be more effective.  The cycle
he is in not only continues to destroy his hope for the future, but it costs taxpayers
thousands of dollars for continuing incarceration and supervision that has proven to be
fruitless and unnecessary.  As such, the district court should have tried something
different.  Mr. Gibbs’s path to complete rehabilitation and a meaningful life may be
different than most people, but that does not mean it is impossible or not worth pursuing
through alternative means.
Additionally, the circumstances behind his two offenses for failing to register do
not indicate that he was trying to be secretive about his location or conceal other sex
crimes.  They simply indicate that he is somewhat irresponsible and distracted.  They
also shed light on how one’s status as a sex offender, combined with the requirements
of probation to maintain full-time employment and pay costs of supervision, can lead to
a frenetic lifestyle between trying to secure employment and coordinate that
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employment with housing.  In 2008, Mr. Gibbs was working at the Holiday Inn in
Pocatello.  (PSI, p.24.)  The manager of the hotel called the Bannock County Sheriff
and reported that Mr. Gibbs was working for him, and he had an address in Custer
County but had been working for him in Pocatello for approximately a month.  (PSI,
p.24.)
When questioned, Mr. Gibbs said he had stayed at a Pocatello address
temporarily, but he lived in Challis.  (PSI, p.24.)  He was then arrested for failing to
register in Bannock County.  (PSI, p.24.)  When detectives went to interview the owner
of the property where he was staying in Pocatello, the owner said Mr. Gibbs had been
living with him, and sometimes staying with another friend, while he was working at the
Holiday Inn, but he would go back to Challis when he was not working.  (PSI, p.24.)
Mr. Gibbs explained that he had lost his job in Challis, so he looked for work in
Pocatello.  (PSI, p.24.)  He said he did not have a permanent residence in Pocatello yet,
but he was looking for one.  (PSI, pp.24-25.)  He said, “I was waiting for funds to obtain
(sic) residence here [and] pay for registering.  I had every intention of registering and
was not avoiding the obligation.”  (PSI, p.25.)
The circumstances underlying his second offense also demonstrated some of the
difficulties he faces in finding housing as a sex offender.  He explained that he had “a lot
of things going on at once,” and he was thinking about his wife’s well-being and health
problems instead of his own.  (PSI, p.8.)  He said his failure to register was not
intentional, and he knew there was no excuse for his lack of responsibility.  (PSI, p.8.)
He said that when his lease was up he found a house to rent, but he was not allowed to
move in because the house was next to a school.  (PSI, p.8.)  He said his wife located a
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place for them to live, and he moved in shortly thereafter but was arrested that same
weekend because he failed to register.3  He said, “I feel like an idiot scared and
uncertain about my future.”  (PSI, p.8.)
With respect to the reasons underlying his other, most recent probation
violations, it is helpful to consider the nature of his life given his current circumstances.
He has trouble finding work because he is a registered sex offender.  (7/25/16
Tr., p.144, Ls.1-20.)  He has lost many of his family members, and his wife4 has
divorced him, so he likely has very little support and has admitted that he used drugs
and alcohol to deal with his grief.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.145, Ls.20-24; PSI, p.50.)  He is still
required to take polygraph tests, so he lives with the fear of admitting things that may
get him sent back to prison, and he must still answer questions about humiliating topics
such as his “masturbation habits.”  (PSI, p.54.)
In short, it does not take a vivid imagination for someone evaluating his life to
reach the conclusion that he must live in a constant state of fear, depression, and
embarrassment, and he must crave some sense of normalcy.  Under these
circumstances, his drug and alcohol use—and his desire to go to a social environment
3 The people he was living with at the home claimed that he had been living there for
three weeks.  (PSI, p.7.)  He said he had only helped them move in and had not actually
moved in himself until the day before.  (PSI, p.7.)
4 Mr. Gibbs married his wife in 2012.  (PSI, p.15.)  His comments in the PSI reveal that
he was very committed to her.  At some point after their marriage, she was diagnosed
with cancer and when he was asked what was most important to him in life, he said,
“My wife and the freedom to spend what time we have together.”  (PSI, pp.19, 50.)
When asked about his goals, he said, “Work, go to school, and be supportive for my
wife.”  (PSI, p.19.)  Finally, when asked whether he had any final comments he had for
the court to consider, he said, “All I want is a chance to be there for my wife.”  (PSI,
p.19.)
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like a bar occasionally—is not surprising,5 neither is his avoidance or deception about
these issues.  (See PSI, p.55.)  But perhaps the most telling fact regarding the long-
term results of his life within the legal system, and the difficulties he has had trying to
succeed on probation and parole is that, when he was challenged for being deceptive at
his last polygraph test, he finally just said he wanted to kill himself.  (PSI, p.55.)
Instead of continuing this cycle, the district court had the opportunity to give
Mr. Gibbs a chance with a different form of punishment.  It is not clear why, but
Mr. Gibbs simply does not do well with supervision.  He obviously realizes that.  This is
likely why,  at  the hearing on his Rule 35 motion,  he asked the district  court  to change
his sentence to three years fixed with no indeterminate time.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.156, L.19 –
p.157, L.19.)  The district court realized this too.  It said, “I don’t think probation and
parole has ever really been something you have been successful with, and that’s too
bad.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.22-25.)  Nevertheless, the district court imposed yet
another prison sentence that will likely be followed by yet another term of parole, which,
if history is any indication, will almost certainly not go well for Mr. Gibbs.  Thus, even
after acknowledging that these punishments never produce the intended results, the
district imposed the same punishments again and denied Mr. Gibbs the opportunity to
take a pending job offer, which would have allowed him to make a new start.  As such, it
abused its discretion because it did not reach its decision through an exercise of
reason, and it did not recognize that additional confinement for Mr. Gibbs was not
necessary to accomplish any of the sentencing goals outlined in Toohill.




Mr. Gibbs respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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